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ABSTRACT
The Employment Act of 1946 created the Council of Economic Advisers as an institution,
and serves as a convenient marker of a broader change in opinions and sentiments: the
assumption by the federal government of the role of stabilizing the macroeconomy.
The magnitude of this shift should not be understated: before the Great Depression strong
currents of macroeconomic theory held that stabilization policy was positively unwise. It solved
problems in the present only
Yet as a result of the shift in
government since WWII has
into action during recession.
by storing up deeper and more dangerous problems for the future.
opinions and sentiments marked by the 1946 Employment Act, no
dared do anything other than let fiscal automatic stabilizers swing
This may well have been a significant force tending to moderate
the post-WWII business cycle.
But the bulk of the CEA’s time and energy now and in the past has been devoted not to
macroeconomic but to macroeconomic issues. The CEA has been one of the few advocates of
the public interest in allocative efficiency present in the government. The CEA has been more
successful in its microeconornic role than many would have predicted ex ante. Its relative
success can be traced to the staffing pattern set up by two strong early chairs—Arthur Burns and
Walter Heller—who made sure that the CEA staff was largely composed of short-term appointees
whose principal loyalties were to the discipline of economics, and who as a result were less
vulnerable to the processes that block pressure for allocative efficiency in other parts of the
government.
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The 1946 Employment Act declared that it was the “continuing policy and responsibility” of the
federal government to “coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources... to foster and
promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare; conditions under which there will be
afforded usefti employment for those able, willing, and seeking to work; and to promote maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power” (see Heller (1966), Bailey (1950)). The Act also
established the President’s Council of Economic Advisers and the Congress’s Joint Economic
Committee, and called on the President to estimate and forecast the current and future level of
11I owe thanks to the National Science Foundation and to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for financial
support. Conversations with Alan Auerbach, John Auten, John Berry, Alan Blinder, Alan Cohen,
Barry Eichengreen, Robert Gillingham, Peter Hall, Alan Krueger, Michael Levy, Charles Maier, Alicia
Munnell, Christina Romer, David Romer, Larry Summers, Tim Taylor, and James Wilcox have been
extremely helpful. The views expressed are my own, and are not the views of any government or
institution.
2I have little to say abou tthe Congressional Joint Economic Committee. At times it has served as an
interesting forum for debate on issues of economic policy. The split between the majority and the4
economic activity in the United States. It thus committed the federal government to the business of
macroeconomic management.
Or did it?
Consider a more recent piece of legislation with a similar tone and more expansive declared
goals that has had next to no effect on American macroeconomic policy. In 1978, the Hurnphrey-
Hawkins Act committed the federal government to reducing the unemployment rate to four percent by
1983 ad to maintaining it ttiea.er. It committed the federal government to reducing the inflation rate
to zero by 1988. It also called for the reduction of federal government spending to “the lowest level
consistent with national needs,” and for spending more money on farm price supports (Weir (1992)).
Finally, it required the Chairman of the Federal Reserve to testify before the Congress twice a year on
the state of the macroeconomy.
In spite of its broad goals, sweeping language, and bold commitments, the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act has had no effect on anything, save that the Federal Reserve Chairman does give his
periodic “Humphrey-Hawkins testimony”; as a result the workload of the Federal Reserve staff is
slightly higher (and perhaps the “transparency” and accountability of Federal Reserve actions has
improved.)
One possible conclusion from Humphrey-Hawkins is that laws which mairdy establish goals
and do not build institutions have no independent effects. However, laws that establish goals can and
do serve as markers of changes in opinions, perceptions, and aims. When people then speak of the
effects of such a law, in many cases they are using “the law” as a shorthand marker to describe
changes in the hearts and the minds of the people. Whether the goal is achieved or pursuit of the goal
effects and constrains public policy depends on the depth of the change in hearts and minds.
minority SM has often been very wide, and the standard pressures from other committees seeking to
maintain their jurisdiction unimpeded have had the expected effects.5
The 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Act in large part went against the flow of shifting opinions and
sentiments. It was passed for short-term political advantage, and was correctly expected to be a dead
letter. The law created no institutions, and marked no changes in hearts and minds toward its goals,
and so it had no effect.
The Employment Act of 1946 is a much more complicated case. It certainly marked the
commi~ent of the federal government to the macroeconomic management business. As originally
introduced, the Full Employment Act required the president to submit a “National Production and
Employment Budget,” or NPEB, that would set out a spending and legislative program for the current
legislative session that would “assure a ftil employment volume of production” in the following fiscal
year–a fiscal year that would begin approximately six months after the submission of the NPEB. This
institutional setup would have solidly entrenched a strong bias toward active countercyclical fiscal
policy in the core of the American Executive Branch.
As finally enacted, the Employment Act called for an annual Ecommic Report “setting forth...
current and foreseeable trends in the levels of employment, production, and purchasing power... and a
program for carrying out the policy” to promote “conditions under which there will be afforded useful
employment for those able, willing, and seeking to work.” The enacted bill is a weaker signal of the
government’s commitment to macroeconomic management than was the initial proposal, but it is a
signal.
The Employment Act of 1946 dso created an institution: the Council of Economic Advisers, or
CEA. But its creation of the CEA as we know it today-one chair, two members, and a senior staff of
15, almost invariably drawn from and planning to return to the professoriate-is best described as an
incident. The original proposal was for an expansion of the Budget Bureau, or perhaps for an “~lce
of Director of the National Budget.” Other institutional arrangements were proposed—a Federal Trade
Commission or Federal Reserve Board-like structure for the Council of Economic Advisers, with
members cotilrmed by the Senate for five-year overlapping terms; the Treasury Secreta~’s proposal
of a cabinet-level economic policy coordination committee chaired by (who else?) the Treasury6
Secretary; and other institutional mgements. The staffs of such alternative institutions would have
likely not been economists on one-or two-yew rotations from the professoriate, but the mix of civil
servants and ex-campaign workers that makeup the operating levels of the White House staff.3
My reading of the legislative history is that the Truman Administration dropped the ball. It
should have been much more concerned about institutional arrangements. I believe that Congress
thought (incorrectly, it turned out) that use of the Senate’s advise-and-consent power over CEA
nominees (and appropriations) could influence macroeconomic policy planning in the Executive Office
of the President.
Only because of the institution-building of Arthur Bums and Walter Heller did the CEA acquire
the recruitment and staffing patterns that it has today.
Thus there are two strands to follow in analyzing the 1946 Employment Act. First come the
institutions: how they functioned and whether they mattered. Second comes the shift in sentiments and
aims that led to the passage of the Employment Act, and of which the Act serves as a convenient
marker. The two strands are interwoven in part because the CEA has served as the channel through
which shifts in the climate of opinion have their effect on the Executive Branch of the U.S.
government, and in part because the authority of the Council has been in large part derived from the
same intellectual currents that underpinned the enactment of the Act.
Stabilization Policy
The largest shift in policy marked by the 1946 Employment Act is the post-WI practice of
allowing the government’s automatic stabilizers to function. Not since the Great Depression have
S Such a cabinet-level economic policy coordinating committee has often existed (and, when it has
existed, has often been chaired by the Secreta~ of the Treasu~). The head of such a committee (when
not the Secretary of the Treasury) and the staff of such a committee have, however, typically been very
different from the members and staff of the CEA.7
mainstream legislators or opinion leaders called for fiscal austerity in the midst of recession. As a
result, the federal government’s budget exhibits substantial cyclical variation, sliding into deeper deficit
in recessions, and moving toward balance or into surplus as the economy expands.
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There have been powerful (and I believe correct) arguments that the federal government has
neither the knowledge of wonomic structure nor the institutional capacity to do any more than allow
fisd automatic stabilizers to function (see Friedman (1953); Eisner (1%9); Stein (1%9, 1980,
1984)). But in political terms, a simpler argument has held sway: that the federal deficit in time of
recession is “eyelid,” and that steps to reduce it immediately would aggravate the recession, have
been effective trump cards in public policy debates. Since World War II, at least, this argument has
kept policy makers from seeking budget balance when unemployment is high.8
Pre-Keynesian Fiscal Theory
The gap between this calm acceptance of automatic stabilizers and the cyclical fiscal deficits
they produce and pre-WWII attitudes is extremely large. Recall that Franklin Roosevelt made Herbert
Hoover’s failure to balance the federal budget in 1932 an issue in the 1932 presidential election. Or
consider Joseph Schumpeter (in Brown, 1934), writing from Harvard in the middle of the Great
Depression that there was a:
presumption agaimt remedial measures ... ~cause] policies of this class are
particularly apt to.. ,produce additional trouble for the future .... For depressions are]
not simply evils, which we might attempt to suppress, but.. forms of something which
has to be done, namely, adjustment to.. change... [and] most of what would be
effective in remedying a depression wotid be equally effective in preventing this
adjustment.
In what Haberler (1937) classified as “monetary over-investment” theories of the business
cycle, depressions were born either from excessively easy monetary policy or out of ex post
overoptimistic expectations. When monetary policy ceased to be too easy, or when investors and
businesses recognized that their forecasts of future growth had been overoptimistic, the economy was
left with a large inventory of investment projects that were unprofitable. True and sustainable economic
recovery was not possible until the economy’s overinvestment overhang had been “liquidated” —and
the painful depression was this process of liquidation. Monetary and fiscal policies to moderate the
depression would, in this conceptual framework, keep workers and firms producing in unsustainable
lines of business and levels of capital intensity. Such attempts to alleviate the depression would make
the depression less deep only at the price of making it longer, and would add to the total sum of human
misery (Hayek (1935)).9
Indeed, Lionel Robbins (1934) went as far as to blame the tiny steps tow~d moderating the
decline in the money stock and boosting fiscal demand that governments undertook over 1929-1933
for the persistence of the Great Depression into the mid-1930s.
This doctrine –that in the long run the Great Depression would turn out to have been “good
medicine” for the economy, and that proponents of stimulative monetary and fiscal policies in the
1930s were shortsighted enemies of the public welfare —did draw some anguished cries of dissent
(Salant (1989)). For example, Keynes (1931) tried to ridicule it:
Some austere and puritanical souls regard [the Great Depression] both as an inevitable
and a desirable nemesis on so much Date 1920s] overexpansion, as they call it; a
nemesis on man’s speculative spirit. It would, they feel, be a victory for the mammon
of unrighteousness if so much prosperity was not subsequently balanced by universal
bankruptcy. We need, they say, what they politely call a ‘prolonged liquidation’ to put
us right. The liquidation, they tell us, is not yet complete. But in time it will be. And
when sufficient time has elapsed for the completion of the liquidation, all will be well
with us again ....
I do not take this view. I find the explanation of the current business losses, of
the reduction in output, and of the unemployment which necessarily ensues not in the
high level of investment which was proceeding up to the spring of 1929, but in the
subsequent cessation of this investment. I see no hope of a recovery except in a revival
of the high level of investment. And I do not understand how universal bankruptcy can
do any good or bring us nearer to prosperity ...
Ralph Hawtrey (1938), an advisor to the British Treasury and the Bank of England, called it the
equivalent of “crying, ‘Fire! Fire!’ in Noah’s flood” (Temin (1989)). The doctrine was not universally
taught; it was, as Milton Friedman would later recall absent from Chicago. But perhaps the presence of
such doctrines at other universities —which Salant (1989) terms the “crime and punishment” theory of
business cycles– helped induce bright economists to rebel and become Keynesians.10
Automatic Stabilizers
Automatic stabilizers may not have significantly reduced post-WWII business-cycle variability
below pre-Depression levels (Romer (1986). And any belief that automatic stabilizers have a
si@lcant effect on business cycle variability does depend on liquidity constraints being pervasive in
the economy (~ bng and Summers (1986)). Nevertheless, the shift in the cyclical behavior of the
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A good ded of this increase in the magnitude of automatic stabilizers comes from the increase
in the size of the government as a share of national product. The post-WWII federal government taxes
and spends one-sixth or more of national product in peucetime. The Depression-era government taxed11
5 to 7 percent and spent 8 to 10 percent of national product. The pre-Depression government taxed and
spent at most 5 percent, and more typically 2 of national product in peacetime.
With a large federal government, automatic stabilizers are significant. If revenues are one-fifth
of national product, a 5-percent fall in output relative to previous forecasts would “automatically”
produce a deficit of 1 percent of national product from the revenue side alone, even in the absence of
overall progressivity. When, as before the Great Depression, both spending and revenues are 5 percent
of national product or less, “automatic stabilizers” cannot have any macroeconomic significance.
Table 1 summarizes how the federal fiscal balance responded to cyclical shifts in production
and employment using simple regressions of the federal fiscal balance (as a share of national product)
on the unemployment rate (using annual data, for fiscal years, and applying Romer’s (1986) suggested
correction to pre-Depression estimates of unemployment rates). These regressions combine the effects
of automatic stabilizers that were allowed to operate (and not offset by attempts to move toward budget
balance in recession) and discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy.
Table 1
Responsiveness of Federal Budget to Unemployment: Pre-World
War 1, Interwar, and Post-World War II
Unemployment Post- 1982
Period Rate Period R2 SEE
1890-1916 -0.056 0.307 0.002
(0.023)
1920-1940 -0.317 0.847 0.010
(0.045)
1950-1995 -0.894 0.526 0.013
(0.188)
1950-1995* -0.680 -0.021 0.746 0.010
(0.1 27) (0.004)12
To no one’s surprise the pre-WWI era shows no signs of stabilizing fiscal policy: the federal
budget balance is correlated with unemployment, but the small size of the federal government means
that a 5 percentage-point rise in the unemployment rate would be associated with only an 0.28
percentage-point rise in the federal deficit as a share of national product.
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The interwar period shows a degree of stabilization: a 5 percentage-point increase in the
unemployment rate is associated with a 1.6 percentage-point increase in the deficit as a share of
national product. The bulk of this effect comes from discretionary federal relief expenditures during the
Great Depression, rather than from the tax side: between 1929 and 1933 revenues remained roughly13
constant as a share of national product as nominal national product fell by more than 45 percent. By
contrast, nominal federal expenditures rose by 50 percent.
Unemployment and the Deficit, 1920-1940
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The post-World War II period shows the greatest cyclical responsiveness of fiscal balance to
unemployment. A 5 percentage-point increme in the unemployment rate is associated with a 4.5
percentage-point increase in the federal deficit as a share of national product over the post-World War
11period m a whole. Allowing for a one-time jump in the structural deficit in the early 1980s as a result
of the change in America’s budget politics from the Reagan 1981 tax cut leads to a slightly smaller
estimate of overall fiscal cyclical stabilization: a five percentage-point increase in the unemployment
rate is associated not with a 4.5 but with a 3.5 percentage-point increase in the federal deficit as a share
of national product.14
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Post-World War II Discretionary Fiscal Policy
The btik of this increase across time in the countercyclicality of the federal budget is the result
of the budget’s growing size. The commitment to macroeconomic management has checked pressures
for fiscal “prudence” that would otherwise have led to procyclical discretionary fiscal policy. In the
post-WWII era, at least, discretionary fiscal policy has given little aid to stabilization, and the degree of
countercyclical movement in the federal budget balance has been very close to that which would have
been generated by the automatic stabilizers alone.
Looking back at the budget since World War II, it is difflctit to argue that on balance
“discretionary” fiscal policy has played any stabilizing role (see Gordon (1980); De bng and15
Summers (1986)). Walter Heller could find one case of successful discretionary stabilization
stabilization policy-the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut —to cite in his New Dimensions o~Political
Economy (Heller (1966)). But other concrete cases are lacking (see, for example, Eisner (1%9)).
The basic difficulty is that recessions are not expected, are not forecasted, and develop rapidly.
Economic policy makers work with shaky data from one quarter or so in the past. Enacting legislation
takes two or three quarters if not two to three years. Appropriated funds require two additional quarters
before they are spent on any substantial scale. And by that time the “need” for stimtius has passed.
The U.S. government lacks the knowledge to design and the institutional capacity to execute a
countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy in response to any macroeconomic cycle of shorter duration
than the Great Depression itself.
By contrast, automatic stabilizers swing into action within the current quarter. A fall in incomes
leads to a shortfall in revenues–and an increase in the deficit-as soon as witholdings reach the
Federal Reserve. It is difficult to imagine how alternative policy instruments could deliver such a
within-the-quarter response to shifts in spending and employment.
Whether the growth of automatic stabilizers has been accompanied by a reduction in post-
WWII business cycle variability below pre-Depression levels is a matter of debate, in view of Romer’s
(1986) convincing demonstration that any such reduction has not been very large. Those who, like me,
believe that automatic stabilizers have had beneficial effects point to large shocks-like the oil-price
supply-shock of 1973 —found in the post-WWII but absent from the pre-Depression period. We argue
that point estimates of cylicial variability show some stabilization. We claim that the issue is not
stabilization relative to pre-Depression but relative to pre-WWII experience, and that the Great
Depression is a draw from the universe of potential pre-Keynesian business cycles.
I believe these arguments. I make each of them at least once a month. Nevertheless, attempting
to reconcile the quantitative estimates of Romer (1986) with a belief in the effectiveness of automatic
stabilizers does not leave me feeling entirely ... comfortable.16
“Structural” Deficits
There is an important argument that the belief in fiscal policy as a tool of economic stabilization
has had harmful consequences for the economy as a whole. Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that
deficits are dangerous because voters are myopic: when spending is raised and taxes are raised to
finance the extra government spending, voters feel both the pain of reduced after-tax incomes and the
benefits of spending programs and can judge whether the one is worth the other; when spending is
raised and financed by borrowing, voters feel the benefits from spending but do not sense the true
resource cost imposed by the higher future taxes (or the hyperinflation) required by indebtedness. The
consequence? A government that is “too large,” in that in engages in spending programs that do not
provide social benefits equal to their resource costs, and a heavier tax burden on future generations.
Democratic politics applied to government spending, Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue,
function well only as long as deficits are effectively prohibited–regarded as a dire moral evil. Thus
arguments that deficit spending cotid be useful as a tool of stabilization policy might undermine the
polity’s immune system that prevents the emergence of borrow-and-spend as standard political
operating procedure. The adoption of borrow-and-spend threatens economic growth: here in the
United States we are still waiting for even the first sign of any endogenous rise in private savings to
offset the “structural” federal budget deficits of the past fifteen years.
It is hard to look back at the politics of America’s federal deficit since 1980 and not conclude
that there is a good deal of truth in Buchanan and Wagner’s argument. The basic economic message is
simple enough: “Cyclical deficit —good. Structural deficit- bad.” Yet this message appears to be a
message that is just a little bit too hard for official Washington to hold on to.
There are alternative explanations for the emergence of structural deficits in the 1980s. For
example, Auerbach (1994) stresses the necessity of slowing the preplanned growth of federal spending17
in the aftermath the post-1973 productivity growth slowdown and its consequent effect on the growth
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It is a heavy irony that made the American political party usually seen as most sympathetic to
Buchanan’s general philosophy–the Republicans-the earner of the policies that he feared would
emerge tim the use of fiscal policy for macroeconomic stabilization.18
Monetary Policy
Whether the fall in nominal monetary aggregates during the slide into the Great Depression best
seen as a mistake of monetary policy or as a shortfall in demand for money is an old argument. In the
first case, the underlyin gproblem was the failure of the Federal Reserve to shovel enough reserves
into the system fast enough; in the second, it was the temporary collapse of the economy’s financial
intermediation “technology” under debt and deflation (Bemanke (1994)). Would a marginally more-
rapid expansion of the high-powered money stock have reduced the size of the Great Depression, or
simply led to a marginally larger decline in the deposit-reserves ratio? I am not cofildent that I know
the answer.
I do, however, know that the same shifts in opinion and sentiment that made Congress
announce in 1946 that macroeconomic stabilization was “the continuing responsibility and policy” of
the federal government have also led the post-WW 11Federal Reserve to make monetary policy with an
eye not just on price stability but on a whole host of other factors as well. It is impossible to believe
that we will see a repeat of the 1929-1933 experience, during which the Federal Reserve largely
ignored the fall in monetary aggregates because it saw money and credit as “easy” in the sense that
credit-worthy borrowers (of whom there were very few by 1933) could still borrow at very low
wminul (but high real) rates of interest.
The adoption by the Federal Reserve of the mission of trying to keep unemployment from
rising “too much” above its natural rate has had costs: monetary policy carried out in the pre-WWII
manner would not have allowed the irdlation of the 1970s. But even in the aftermath of the Volcker
disinflation, the Federal Reserve continues to act as though bringing unemployment down whenever it
rises far above its natural rate is a high priority: in the most recent business cycle, the Federal Reserve
pushed real short-term interest rates to and held them at wgative levels from late 1991 until the
beginning of 1994. Here, too, the shift in the concerns and missions of economic policy makers
signalled by the 1946 Employment Act continues to hold.19
Macroeconomic Efficiency
In recent years, at least, macroeconomic policy management has not been the most time-
consuming mission of the CEA. In the absence of belief in and plans for discretionary fiscal policy, the
macroeconomic stabilization policy roles of the CEA are smaller. One role remaining is the protection
of the fiscal automatic stabilizers from policy changes that might disrupt their operation; for example,
across different administrations the CEA has been an effective lobbyist against versions of balanced-
budget proposals that would enforce year-by-year balance no matter what the level of the
unemployment rate
The CEA does communicate its own view of the economy to the Federal Reserve, with the
hope of reducing the possibility that the Federal Reserve will talk itself into a false vision of the
economy. It attempts to communicate the Federal Reserve’s view of the universe to the rest of the
Administration. It attempts to persuade various Assistants to the President that Federal Reserve-
bashing has significant costs and few benefits. It helps the President convince the press that he
understands how the economy is working, and that the current Administration’s economic policies are
appropriate. And it writes the annual Economic Report of the President.
But these tasks all together consume perhaps 70 senior staff and member person-months a
year. The Council of Economic Advisers has some 180 senior staff and member person-months
available.
The rest of the Council of Economic Advisers’ time is spent on “macroeconomic” issues,
attempting to inject a sense of the public interest (sir, consumers aren’t organized and demanding
meetings with you eve~ week, but they would be significantly harmed by this policy); of the fact that
the economy is an equilibrium system in which accounting identities hold (sir, if private savings
remain anemic and the administration is lucky enough to see an investment-led recovery, we will see a
sharply-rising trade deficit which will increase pressures for protection); and of the speed with which
firms, workers, and consumers respond to incentives (sir, under this proposal a small low-wage firm
pays $2,000 less for health coverage for a minimum wage worker than a large firm, so if it is enacted20
you will see a lot of large firms fire their minimum-wage workers and a lot of small firms hire such
workers).
Often the CEA gets flattened. To paraphrase one not-very-senior White House official, the
public interest is just one more interest among many, so why should it deserve special consideration?
To quote one ex-member of the Council of fionomic Advisers, “in this business 0.250 is still a very,
very good batting average.” The logic of government is not allocative efficiency enforced by market
discipline. The logic of government is the logic of politics: power exercised, influence used, and
reciprocal favors returned. And it is not clear that this political logic is inappropriate for what are at
bottom political questions.
But sometimes the CEA does make a macroeconomic difference. And this maybe its most
significant contribution to economic welfare. That the CEA is able to make a positive contribution to
the rnicroeconomic efficiency of public policy is in large part the consequence of the s~lng pattern
established by Burns and Heller. Members and staff come from academic and think-tank positions,
look forward to returning to academic positions, and view academic and think-tank researchers as the
primary reference peer group whose approval they seek. Evelyn Waugh (1937) wrote of a tyrannical
boss– Lord Beast– with whom people dared disagree only very gingerly: “Up to a point, brd
Beast.” Those who make a career of government are well aware that those in authority are rarely
pleased by bad news, and find themselves under immense pressure to say “up to a point...” The
Council of fionomic Advisers is somewhat less likely to say “Up to a point,” when what is called for
is “No!”
Perhaps this institutional capability to sometimes make a difference in terms of macroeconomic
efficiency is due to the operation of an Invisible Hand. Certainly it is not an outcome that anyone
planned. Establishing in the White House staff a group of short-term employees with a primary
allegiance to economists’ sense of the public interest may have been the furthest thing from the minds
of those who wrote Section 4 of the 1946 Employment Act. Their goal was to reduce the freedom of21
action of the President and his staff by fixing responsibility for stabilization policy planning on
identifiable individuals chosen with the consent of the Senate.
Conclusion: Hearts and Minds
The principal key to understanding the 1946 Employment Act is that it should be taken as a
signal: a signal that henceforth an administration that failed to achieve acceptable macroeconomic
performance was a failed administration.
What if there had been no 1946 Employment Act? One possible answer is that things would
have been little different the same pressures that led to the passage of the 1946 Employment Act would
still have existed. Fiscal and monetary policy would still have been shaped with both eyes on
macroeconomic performance. And there would probably have been an Employment Act of 1947, or
1948, or 1949.
A second possible answer is that there could have been no 1946 Employment Act only if the
shifts in sentiment and opinion of which the 1946 Employment Act was a signal had not occurred, and
if attitudes toward Zaissez-faire as a principle, toward government responsibility for the economy, and
toward the likely effectiveness of government macroeconomic intervention in 1946 had been much
more like attitudes in 1929.
A world in which opinion leaders and policy makers had not learned the lessons taught by the
Great Depression and World War II would have been a very different world—presumably a world in
which post-World War II macroeconomists called themselves Hayekians rather than Keynesians,
discoursed on how deep recessions were a necessary price for the dynamic growth efficiencies of
market-led economic development, and one in which governments responded to depressions by cutting
spending and raising tax rates to keep the budget in balance (thus preventing investors from losing
cotildence and making the depression worse). In such a world an outbreak of inflation like that seen in
the 1970s would have been very unlikely. In such a world a repeat of the Great Depression wotid22
have been somewhat more likely. I do not think that many of us would think that it would have been a
better world than the one in which we have lived for the past fifty years. But my opinion depends on a
belief that the social and economic costs of the outbreak of inflation in the 1970s were low relative to
the probability and cost of another episdoe like the Great Depression.
There is yet a third answer. In the absence of the @uZur institutional structure setup by the
1946 Employment Act, economists in government would have been fewer and less powerful. To some
degree the then-Budget Bureau— now the Office of Management and Budget —and its director would
have fulfilled missions now fulfilled by the CEA: career civil servants in Executive Branch cabinet
departments do refer to OMB and CEA as “sister agencies,” and many times the Director of OMB has
been drawn from the set of economists also on the natural short list for CEA chair.4 But in the absence
of the CEA to serve as an institutionalized voice for macroeconomic efficiency, macroeconomic
efficiency as a goal of public policy would have likely played a smaller and feebler role in economic
policy making.
4For example, think of George Shultz, Charles Schtitze, or Alice Rivlin.23
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